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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PARENTHOOD AND THE LIMITS OF ADULT AUTONOMY

LYNN D. WARDLE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Cultural anthropologists use the concept of “root paradigms” to explain
how society prepares and guides its members to cope with crises of personal,
familial and social identity.1 All societies provide their members with root
paradigms that “reflect the assumptions underlying the very nature of
existence . . . . They guide behavior of both individuals and groups in the crises
of life and often require self-sacrifice on the part of individuals in the interest
of group welfare.”2 Root paradigms “are, at the socio-cultural level, analogous
to DNA and RNA at the genetic level.”3 They crystallize the formative
validity beliefs of society.
One fundamental root paradigm of most Western societies is “responsible
parenthood”—the high commitment of individuals and societies to the welfare
of children and posterity. This article addresses two significant challenges to
the “root paradigm” of responsible parenthood. The first challenge is the
conflict between responsible parenthood and another root paradigm, that of
adult personal autonomy. Part II of this article shows that absolute autonomy
of parents in matters such as sexual lifestyle conflicts with, and is sometimes
irreconcilable with, commitment to the welfare of future generations. For
example, parental infidelity deeply harms children. The assumption of
parental responsibilities necessarily requires the voluntary subordination or
curtailment of some of the parents’ personal autonomy in matters relating to
sexual behavior.

* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the European Regional Conference of the International Society of Family Law on The Role of
Self-Determination in the Modernization of Family Law in Europe, Tossa de Mar, Girona, Spain,
October 9-10, 2003. Valuable research assistance was provided by Justin Starr and Brinton
Wilkins.
1. See Merlin G. Myers, The Morality of Kinship, Speech at the Virginia F. Cutler Lecture
(Nov. 15, 1983), in BYU SPEECHES OF THE YEAR, 1983-84, at 45 (1984). See also VICTOR
TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY 23-59
(1974) (examining how paradigms influence human behavior).
2. Myers, supra note 1, at 45.
3. Id.
169

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

170

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:169

The second challenge to the root paradigm of responsible parenthood
comes from efforts to redefine that root paradigm. For example, the movement
to legalize adoption of children by same-sex couples can be seen as an attempt
to redefine the fundamental root paradigm of responsible parenthood. Part III
of this article explains how general legalization of adoption by same-sex
couples would radically alter the nature of the root paradigm of responsible
parenthood, and would undermine the time-proven dual gender model and
ideal of responsible parenthood.
II. RECONCILING TWO ROOT PARADIGMS THAT SOMETIMES CONFLICT
A.

Two Root Paradigms in Western Societies: Autonomy and Posterity

One root paradigm of the Western world today, especially in the United
States and Western Europe, can be called “autonomy.”
It involves
commitment to protect, foster, and empower individual autonomy, or
“independence.”4 “Modern Western society has tended to view human
dependency as tantamount to subordination, or even as a sign of inferiority.”5
This autonomy root paradigm is especially pronounced in the United
States. “The American people are well known for stressing the role of
individual rights within society.”6 As far back as 1831 Alexis de Tocqueville
noted that individual “sovereignty” (i.e., liberty) was the “fundamental
principle” and “the grand maxim upon which civil and political society rests in
the United States.”7 More recently, Professor Carl Schneider has written that
“[p]erhaps no idea in American life has become so convincing as the belief that
each of us is entitled to live autonomously.”8 Americans “abhor[] . . .
dependence,” to the point that they even “fear ties that bind.”9 Even patients
who are very sick or terminally ill feel threatened by their loved ones because

4. THE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 55 (1986).
5. Akira Morita, On the Concept of Human Rights—A Cross-Cultural Reconsideration at 4
(Feldkirch, Aug. 31, 2002) (on file with author).
6. Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the Window
of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 517, 518 (1993).
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 418 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1953) (1835). See also id. (“[E]very man is allowed freely to take that road which
he thinks will lead him to heaven, just as the law permits every citizen to have the right of
choosing his own government.”).
8. Carl E. Schneider, Fixing the Family: Legal Acts and Cultural Admonitions, in
REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN AGENDA
FOR STRENGTHENING MARRIAGE 181 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002).
9. Id.
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they so deeply resent being in a status of dependence, even upon wife or
husband, parents or children.10
The values of personal independence and autonomy that comprise this root
paradigm strongly influence American family law. The dominant policy in the
area of family law over the past thirty years (such as emergence of
constitutional doctrine of privacy, enactment of unilateral, no-fault divorce
laws, and legitimation of previously prohibited sexual relations, etc.) has
tended toward replacing restrictive old public norms with new
individually-determined standards (autonomy).11
Another fundamental root paradigm common throughout Western societies
is the high commitment of individuals, as well as society, to the welfare of
future generations.12 This root paradigm may be called “responsible
parenthood.” The social dimension of this paradigm is commitment to
posterity, articulated beautifully in the Preamble of the Constitution of the
United States, written in 1787, which reads:
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.13

The Founders of the American Republic were not acting merely to secure their
own liberties, but to secure the blessings of liberty for their posterity.
“Posterity” was a word that was used very prominently in many state
constitutions and declarations of rights in the founding era.14 At the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, where the Constitution of the United States
was drafted, Roger Sherman reminded his fellow delegates: “We are providing
for our posterity, for our children & our grand Children [sic] . . . .”15 Likewise,
James Wilson observed: “We should consider that we are providing a
Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar

10. See id. at 181-82.
11. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807-08 (1985) (describing the diminution of moral
discourse in family law); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WISC. L. REV.
1443, 1508 (1992) (describing the “privatization” of family law).
12. See Myers, supra note 1, at 49.
13. U.S. CONST. pmbl (emphasis added).
14. Raymond B. Marcin, “Posterity” in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38
AM. J. JURIS. 273, 276-77 (1993) (citing the Pennsylvania Constitution, Massachusetts Bill of
Rights, and Virginia Declaration of Rights).
15. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 288
(Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1893).
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circumstances of the moment.”16 The fact that Americans still enjoy the
liberties won in 1776 may be due in no small part to the fact that the founders
of that generation were deeply committed to the welfare not of themselves and
their own generation, but that of their children and all posterity.
The importance of responsible parenthood and commitment to posterity
has deep roots in Western civilization. One of the best-known examples comes
from the last two verses of the Old Testament:
5 Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great
and dreadful day of the LORD:
6 And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of
the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse.17
This indicates that unless there is a bonding of the generations, turning the
hearts of fathers to children and the hearts of children to their fathers, the entire
society will be cursed. Similar teachings can be found in many other great
world religions. For example, the Qu’ran teaches that children are a bounty
from Allah.18 A famous “hadith” (the sayings of Mohammed and his
companions), states: “Paradise lies at the feet of mothers.”19 The Prophet
taught that husbands have the duty to support their families, that women
nurturing young children are entitled to special support, and that a father’s
salvation and exaltation in heaven depend on his providing properly for and
patiently teaching his children.20

16. Id. at 376.
17. Malachi 4:5-6 (King James). See also THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 98:16-17 (1981) (“Therefore, renounce war
and proclaim peace, and seek diligently to turn the hearts of the children to their fathers, and the
hearts of the fathers to the children; . . . lest I come and smite the whole earth with a curse, and all
flesh be consumed before me.”).
18. HOLY QUR’AN (AL A’RAF) 7:190, available at http://www.alislam.org/quran/translation/
7.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); see also Kathleen A. Portuán Miller, The Other Side of the
Coin: A Look at Islamic Law As Compared to Anglo-American Law—Do Muslim Women Really
Have Fewer Rights Than American Women?, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65, 103 (2003).
19. Miller, supra note 18, at 103 (citing B. AISHA LEMU, WOMAN IN ISLAM 239 (1992));
Shaikha Kouthar Allie Cader, Family Life in Islam/Women in Islam, Address Before the World
Family Policy Forum at Brigham Young University 4 (July 14, 2003) (transcript on file with
author) (attributing this saying to the Prophet); Miller, supra note 18, at 103-04 (“[T]he Holy
Qur’an . . . says, ‘Sacred are family relationships that arise through marriage and women bearing
children.’ Motherhood and children are highly valued in the Islamic culture.”); id. at 104
(“Mohammed said: ‘He whosever has three daughters and exercises patience with them, feeds
them, clothes them according to his own income, will . . . be protected from the hellfire (will have
a place in heaven).’”); see also ISLAMI CITY, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM AND THE MUSLIMS, at
http://www.islamicity.com/Mosque/uiatm/un_islam.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
20. See supra note 19.
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Thus, the root paradigm of responsible parenthood—individual and social
commitment to children and to posterity—is deeply rooted in Western and
other societies, including America. It is at least as deeply imbedded in
Western civilization as the root paradigm of autonomy.
B.

The Potential for Conflict Between Autonomy and Posterity

Obviously, there is potential for conflict between these two root
paradigms. The commitment to provide for the best interests of children
sometimes conflicts with the pursuit or exercise of adult autonomy.21 This
conflict is especially profound when the sexual practices of adults conflict with
their parental responsibilities.22 Some sexual practices adults may choose to
enjoy or experiment with raise serious risk of harm for children. Some sexual
relations that adults without children may engage in with little apparent,
short-term detriment for themselves may expose children to grave
developmental risks. This is true of some heterosexual and some homosexual
practices.
C. An Example: How Parental Infidelity Harms Children
Infidelity to a husband or wife may be deemed improper, especially if the
legal commitment of marriage has been made, but if the couple has no
children, there seems to be very little social stigma and little or no criminal or
civil sanctions in most Western countries.23 However, when children are
involved, spousal infidelity may be treated more seriously because parental
adultery may have very severe consequences for children.

21. See FRANK PITTMAN, M.D., PRIVATE LIES: INFIDELITY AND THE BETRAYAL OF
INTIMACY 272-73 (1989).
22. Id. at 266.
23. I mention this to describe current conditions, not to endorse them. I have criticized the
prevailing rule in America which bars consideration of adultery in most custody cases. Lynn D.
Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation, 52 CATH. U. L. REV.
81, 92 (2002) (adultery is irrelevant in custody cases in most states unless clear, direct harm to the
child can be shown); see also Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the
Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 50-51 & n.36 (1991) (half of the American states had repealed
criminal adultery laws by 1991); see also Miller, supra note 18, at 91-92 (adultery is punishable
by stoning under Islamic law; fornication is punished by flogging); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the
Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1431-32 (2003) (Islamic women in many countries still experience
flogging and stoning for sexual offenses); but see Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the
Untied States: Following the European Lead? 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 140 n.58 (2002) (“a
substantial number of states . . . impos[e] the death penalty for . . . adultery.”). I do not
recommend these severe sanctions, but include reference to them to show that infidelity in
relationships where children often/usually are present may be treated as a serious offense.
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Psychologists explain that parental adultery confuses and frightens
children, who often blame themselves for their parents’ unhappiness.24 These
children think it is because of something that they did or said or failed to do, or
perhaps because of their bad thoughts or evil wishes.25 Dr. Frank Pittman
stated:
Small children [whose parents commit adultery] tend to develop symptoms of
insecurity, regressing to the behavior of younger children. They may exhibit
anxiety symptoms, with clinging, bed-wetting, thumb-sucking, fire-setting,
temper tantrums, night terrors—in fact, anything that seems an appropriate
response to the fear that their family is about to be wiped out.26

Dr. Evelyn Berger adds that children whose parents have been unfaithful may
demonstrate “defiance, refusal to eat, irritability, quarrelsomeness, clowning,
withdrawing, enuresis, temper tantrums, dawdling, daydreaming, listlessness,
sleepwalking, or poor grades at school.”27
For older children whose parents commit adultery, Dr. Pittman reports that
“[s]hoplifting, running away from home, and setting fire to the house are
frequent ways of acting out. These behaviors may have a certain metaphoric
appropriateness.”28 “Suicide attempts among children and adolescents are a
frequent response to parental adultery . . . . The child is asking, ‘Who is more
important? Your child or your affair?’”29 School performance may fall
drastically.30 Dr. Pittman notes: “The traumas of infidelity and divorce are
overwhelming for children of any age, even children who are fifty years old
and grandparents. But perhaps they are hardest on adolescents . . . .”31 A
psychologist wrote of the experience of one boy whose father had left his
mother for an adulterous partner; the boy “ran away from home and got into
the gay scene . . . . [A]ll [his siblings] went through some depression. One of

24. See Wardle, supra note 23, at 112-29; see also PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 260;
WARNER TROYER, DIVORCED KIDS 40-42 (1979); JANIS ABRAHMS SPRING PH.D. & MICHAEL
SPRING, AFTER THE AFFAIR: HEALING THE PAIN AND REBUILDING TRUST WHEN A PARTNER
HAS BEEN UNFAITHFUL 124-25 (1996); EVELYN MILLER BERGER PH.D., TRIANGLE: THE
BETRAYED WIFE 133-34 (1971); DR. JAMES C. DOBSON, LOVE MUST BE TOUGH: NEW HOPE
FOR FAMILIES IN CRISIS 3 (1996).
25. See BERGER, supra note 24, at 134-35.
26. PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 262.
27. BERGER, supra note 24, at 131.
28. PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 262.
29. Id. at 263. See also DOBSON, supra note 24, at 110 (describing suicide attempt by
thirteen-year old after parental infidelity).
30. “A thirteen-year old boy who had been an ‘A’ student began to fail in junior high school.
A former intelligence test had placed him in the ‘superior’ group. The school psychologist tested
him again, and his score had dropped to the ‘dull normal’ level. This boy loved his father, who
had left to live with another woman.” BERGER, supra note 24, at 131.
31. PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 263.
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[his sisters] had epileptic seizures . . . caused by depression . . . .”32 A mother
whose husband left her for another woman “cried almost incessantly for twelve
months, and [later], her thirteen-year-old daughter tried to commit suicide.”33
The potential impact upon teenage sexual behavior is particularly harmful
for adolescent children. “Classically, they either become promiscuous . . . or
they render themselves sexually undesirable . . . .”34 “Children of infidelity,
especially the sons of philanderers, are very much at risk to become
philanderers themselves.”35 “They may decide that . . . infidelities are normal
and marriage is [simply] impossible. They may go even further and decide to
give up on the entire opposite sex.”36 Increasingly, children of adulterous
parents may turn to homosexual behavior.37
There is a “sleeper effect” upon many children whose parents have been
unfaithful, an emotional time bomb that goes off when the child becomes an
adult and faces the challenge of forming bonds of trust and intimacy for
himself or herself. Dr. Janis Abrahms Spring explains:
[L]ong after the infidelity has been acknowledged or put to rest, [children] may
still be scarred, may still be harboring negative feelings about [themselves] and
carrying them . . . into [their] most intimate relationships. Riddled with
insecurity, [they] may have trouble perceiving [themselves] as a worthy,
lovable, special human being. It’s not easy to love, or be loved, when feelings
of abandonment, invalidation, or betrayal are core to [one’s] sense of self.38

Dr. Pittman notes: “[M]ost commonly, children [of an adulterous parent] . . .
lose their faith in marriage . . . . They may decide that . . . infidelities are
normal and marriage is [simply] impossible.”39 Dr. Berger writes:
A rejected wife tearfully told her small daughter that her life was ruined. Her
father had done something wicked and the situation “wasn’t fair.” “Men are
undependable and should never be trusted,” she said bitterly. Her words upset
her little girl, but her mother’s hostile, martyred attitude had an even more
lasting effect on her daughter’s outlook on marriage and men in general.40

By the same token,
[t]he wife who loses her husband to another woman may, without realizing it,
rear her son with the idea that men are faithless creatures who can’t be trusted.
The son, becoming a man himself, lacks self-acceptance. Infidelity in his own
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

DOBSON, supra note 24, at 124.
Id. at 110.
PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 263.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 266-67.
See DOBSON, supra note 24, at 124.
SPRING & SPRING, supra note 24, at 125.
PITTMAN, supra note 21, at 266-67.
BERGER, supra note 24, at 138.
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later years may be due to the suggestions of a poor example, or the lack of
self-respect as a male—possibly both.41

Warner Troyer writes:
All of the adults I interviewed felt the divorce in their childhoods had altered
or atrophied their prospects for full and happy marital relationships. Many
said they had determined in their youth that they would have no children of
their own and had even made that a condition of marriage in later years. Even
at forty and fifty years of age and beyond, these former “divorced kids” were
fearful of commitment, uncertain as to their ability to maintain enduring
relationships. Some, divorced themselves, specifically blamed their parents for
their own marital failures; they’d “rushed into marriage to find the emotional
security I missed at home” or they had “been conditioned to believe there was
no permanence in marriage.”42

A middle-aged man, in counseling to deal with his own infidelities, wrote a
letter to his father who had committed adultery and left his wife, the man’s
mother, nearly thirty years earlier. In part, the letter said:
For years I couldn’t face how angry I was with you for leaving me, for rarely
making me feel you loved me or were proud of me, for making me take care of
Mom . . . . When I was thirteen and you left, I decided I’d never let anyone get
close to me again, and I’d never love anyone again. I kept my promise.43

Thus, absolute sexual autonomy may be incompatible with parental
responsibility because it poses serious risk to the emotional welfare and
healthy development of children.
D. Resolving the Conflict - Priority for Posterity
When the root paradigms of autonomy and posterity conflict, which should
be given priority? Renowned cultural anthropologist, Professor Merlin G.
Myers, suggested a way to resolve root paradigm conflict when he indicated
that “relationships can be ranked on a continuum on the basis of their moral
content.”44 He noted that “sacrifice is the ready index to the moral quality of a
relationship. If one is willing to sacrifice only a little, morality is small; if
much, morality is great.”45 Dr. Myers stated:
In a purely technical means-to-end relationship, the failure of the means to
achieve the desired end results . . . in a change of means . . . . [S]ome . . .

41. Id. at 142.
42. TROYER, supra note 24, at 146-47.
43. SPRING & SPRING, supra note 24, at 130-31. See also JULIA THORNE, A CHANGE OF
HEART: WORDS OF EXPERIENCE AND HOPE FOR THE JOURNEY THROUGH DIVORCE 136 (1996)
(where a son explains his anger towards his father for having an affair).
44. Myers, supra note 1, at 50.
45. Id. at 55.
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human social relationships are like this. When there is delay or imbalance in
the reciprocal aspects of the relationship, it may be terminated. (People are
then being dealt with as if they were things.) However, in other kinds of
relationships, neither delay nor imbalance terminates the association . . . . [I]t is
morality that makes the difference. The demand for an immediate, or for a
strictly equivalent, return for services or presentations given is tantamount to a
denial of any moral relationship between the parties, while the presence of
delay and imbalance between gift and counter-gift is synonymous with the
presence of morality.46

Dr. Myers also noted that “the process of human reproduction gives rise to
relationships of a special kind having their origin in a unique domain of social
life.”47 Furthermore:
The domain of kinship predicates a kind of morality characterized by kindness
and a predisposition to love and care . . . . The words kindness, kin and the
German word for child, kind . . . express the moral character of kinship.
Kinsmen are expected to be loving, just, and generous one to another. They do
not demand strict equivalent returns for services rendered. Kinship morality is
automatically binding.48

While other social relationships generally are characterized by reciprocity,
kinship is not.49
This analysis suggests that the assumption of parenthood requires the
socially-reinforced voluntary subordination or sacrifice of some degree of
personal autonomy. There are things society cannot allow parents to do which
it might (and which many nations do) allow autonomous adults who have not
assumed the responsibilities of parenting to do. Conversely, there are some
things that autonomous adults may choose to do that may, at least temporarily,
disqualify them from assuming the responsibilities of parenthood.
In his intriguing book, The End of History and the Last Man, Francis
Fukuyama agrees with this proposition. He argues that “liberal societies” are
likely the epitome of political evolution, but they contain the seeds of their
own destruction.50 That is because
families don’t really work if they are based on liberal principles, that is, if their
members regard them as they would a joint stock company, formed for their
utility rather than being based on ties of duty and love. Raising children or
making a marriage work through a lifetime requires personal sacrifices that are
irrational, if looked at from a cost-benefit calculus. For the true benefits of
strong family life frequently do not accrue to those bearing the heaviest
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Myers, supra note 1, at 48.
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 324-25 (1992).
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obligations, but are transmitted across generations. Many of the problems of
the contemporary American family—the high divorce rate, the lack of parental
authority, alienation of children, and so on—arise precisely from the fact that it
is approached by its members on strictly liberal grounds. That is, when the
obligations of family become more than what the contractor bargained for, he
or she seeks to abrogate the terms of the contract.51

Moreover, in the conflict between the root paradigms of autonomy and
commitment to the welfare of children and posterity, we must remember that
the “moral character of kinship” provides the basis of law and pre-law in all
societies.52 Parenting provides
the birth of law in human experience and serves the needs for order in all
human affairs. The first encounter of the individual with law is the law of his
parents, and herein one is conditioned and trained to cope with law as it is
applied in the outer world.53

Thus, if law as we know it (liberal, democratic law) is to survive, the
traditional root paradigm of priority in social commitment to children must be
maintained. The assumption of parental responsibilities necessarily requires
the voluntary subordination or curtailment of some of the parents’ personal
autonomy in matters relating to sexual behavior. Given the potential harm to
children, society has compelling reasons to require parents to refrain from
irresponsible sexual behavior.
III. REDEFINING THE ROOT PARADIGM OF COMMITMENT TO THE WELFARE OF
CHILDREN
Some rather dramatic, even radical, changes in several of the root
paradigms of Western societies have been proposed recently. The movement
to legalize adoption by same-sex couples is one prominent example. The effort
to legalize adoption by same-sex couples is more than a mere attempt to
subordinate the root paradigm of “commitment to the welfare of children” to
the root paradigm of “personal adult autonomy of lesbians and gays.” In an
even more fundamental sense, the campaign to legalize gay or “second-parent”
adoptions represents an attempt to fundamentally redefine the root paradigm of
responsible parenting itself by profoundly altering the very nature and ends of
parenting. The movement to generally legalize adoptions by same-sex couples
represents an attempt to redefine parenthood from a relationship requiring the
commitment of both men and women together to the best interests of children,
to furthering the child-rearing interests of any one or more autonomous adults.

51. Id. at 324.
52. Myers, supra note 1, at 49, 51.
53. Id. at 51.
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The Movement to Legalize Gay Couple Adoption in the United States

There is a growing, vocal movement in the United States to legalize
adoption by same-sex couples. While only a few states have adopted that
policy by legislation or supreme court ruling,54 there is strong support for the
movement among intellectuals. For example, one survey of law review
literature published in 1997 found the ratio of publications favoring gay
parenting to publications opposing such parenting to be 92:1.55
Appellate courts in only twelve states and the District of Columbia have
addressed the question whether existing adoption laws allow gay couples to
adopt. Appellate courts in seven states and the District of Columbia have
interpreted the adoptions laws to allow gay partners to adopt,56 while appellate
courts in at least five other states have rejected such claims.57
54. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2002) (stating in relevant part, “If a family
unit consists of a parent and the parent’s partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child,
the partner of a parent may adopt a child of the parent.”); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d
554, 574 (Cal. 2003) (allowing “second parent” adoption); In re Adoption of Charles B., 552
N.E.2d 884, 890 (Ohio 1990) (homosexuals are not as a matter of law ineligible to adopt); In re
Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) (law does not prevent unmarried same-sex
partners from adopting a child); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 2002)
(same-sex adoptions allowable). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple
Adoption-Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345 (2003).
55. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, U.
ILL. L. REV. 833, 836-37, 899-06 (1997).
56. See Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 573-74 (allowing adoption by former lesbian partner); In re
M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 840, 859 (D.C. 1995) (allowing second-parent adoption in stages by a
gay male couple); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (allowing lesbian partner
adoption); In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (former judge did not have
authority to prevent later judge from issuing order allowing lesbian partners to adopt); Adoption
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993); Adoption of Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Mass.
1997); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993);
In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995);
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 100102 (N.Y. Sur. 1992); In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d at 885, 889-90 (adoption of
severely impaired eight-year-old child by his male counselor not barred because the prospective
adoptive parent is a homosexual man living with his male partner); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803
A.2d at 1202 (exception provision gives court discretion to grant partner’s adoption that
otherwise are not allowed by statute); In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000) (adoption by former same-sex partner as individual allowed); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d at 1276; Marc Wolinsky, Stereotypes, Tolerance and Acceptance: Gay Rights in Courts
of Law and Public Opinion, 19 DEL. LAWYER 13, 18 (2001).
57. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp.2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (two of three intervener couple
with group home); In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (statutes do not
allow lesbian partner adoption; no violation of equal protection); State v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210,
1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d in part and quashed in part on other grounds sub nom.
Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995); In re Adoption of
Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio
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Legislators in most states have shown little interest in amending the
adoption laws to explicitly allow gay couples to adopt. For example,
legislatures in six states have passed laws to allow gay couple adoption,58
while five state legislatures (including one that also allows some gay
adoptions) have enacted laws that bar to some degree adoption by homosexual
couples.59
B.

The Sharon S. Decision

Many of the cases interpreting adoption laws to permit gay adoptions rely
on very distorted and flimsy analyses. The recent California Supreme Court
decision, Sharon S. v. Superior Court,60 is a prime example. The facts of this
case are rather complicated (as many of these cases are). Sharon and Annette
lived together in a lesbian relationship for eleven years.61 Sharon had one
Ct. App. 1998) (lesbian partner may not adopt without termination of biological parent’s rights);
In re Bonfield, 773 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ohio 2002) (ruling that lesbian partner is not a parent but
can file for shared custody; and noting in dicta that “second parent adoption is not available in
Ohio”); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1999) (second-parent adoption not
permitted under stepparent adoption statutes). See also In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d
1035 (Conn. 1999) (adoption review board has no authority to waive statutes requiring
termination of biological same-sex parent’s parental rights if partner adopts) (overturned by
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724(a)(3) (West 2000) the following year); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So.
2d 656, 662 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Payne, J., concurring) (noting that Mississippi does not allow
same-sex partner to adopt).
58. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2002) (“A domestic partner, as defined in Section
297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her domestic partner may for that purpose file a petition in
the county in which the petitioner resides.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a)(3) (2000) (“Subject
to the approval of the Court of Probate as provided in section 45a-727, any parent of a minor
child may agree in writing with one other person who shares parental responsibility for the child
with such parent that the other person shall adopt or join in the adoption of the child, if the
parental rights, if any, of any other person other than the parties to such agreement have been
terminated.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1999) (In 1999, New Hampshire legislators
repealed that state’s 12-year ban on gay adoption and foster parenting); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §
110 (McKinney 1999) (allowing unmarried adults to adopt); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b)
(2002) (“If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent’s partner, and adoption is in the best
interest of the child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the
parent’s parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection.”); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting the state’s adoption statute as “encouraging the
adoption of as many children as possible regardless of the sexual orientation . . . of the individuals
seeking to adopt them”). Some of these laws were passed after state courts had interpreted earlier
statutes to allow gay couple adoptions.
59. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-6 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45a-726a (2002). See generally William C. Duncan, In Whose Best Interests: Sexual
Orientation and Adoption Law, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 787 (2003).
60. 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
61. Id. at 558.
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child, Zachary, by artificial insemination and Annette adopted that child with
Sharon’s consent (although it was not then settled whether lesbian partners
could adopt). Sharon then conceived again by artificial insemination and gave
birth to a second child, Joshua.62 Again, Annette filed a petition to adopt
Joshua, Sharon signed her consent to that adoption, and the local Department
of Health and Human Services performed a home study and recommended
approval of the adoption.63 However, before any action was taken on the
petition for adoption, Sharon and Annette’s relationship became volatile.64
Sharon asked Annette to move out and later obtained a domestic violence
restraining order against Annette.65
Annette filed a motion asking the court to grant her petition to adopt
Joshua, and Sharon moved to withdraw her consent to the adoption, asserting
that the adoption was not permitted under California adoption laws and
claiming that her consent had been obtained by fraud or duress and that
withdrawal of her consent was in Joshua’s best interest.66 A mediator
recommended shared custody and the Department of Health and Human
Services recommended the adoption petition be granted because Annette had
shared paying for Joshua’s medical expenses, had been a part of his daily care
since birth, and had a close loving relationship with Joshua similar to her
relationship with Zachary.67 The court-appointed lawyer for Joshua filed a
motion to dismiss Annette’s adoption proceeding.68 When the trial court
declined the motion to dismiss the adoption petition, Sharon and the lawyer for
Joshua then filed a petition for writ of mandate with the California Court of
Appeals.69 The appellate court granted the writ and held that California
adoption law prohibited adoption by unmarried partners.70 The California
Supreme Court reversed and remanded.71
California adoption law specifically provides that “[t]he birth parents of an
adopted child are, from the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental rights
towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over
the child.”72 Another provision, however, specifically allows a married
stepparent to adopt his or her spouse’s child without the termination of the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 559.
Id. at 574.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 2002).
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natural parents’ rights.73 A third provision, recently enacted, also allows
registered same-sex domestic partners to adopt the children of each other
without terminating the parental rights of the partner who is the child’s
biological parent.74 This case did not involve a married couple (California law
does not allow same-sex marriage) or a registered domestic partnership
(Sharon and Annette were not registered domestic partners). Thus, the
principal legal question was interpretation of these adoption provisions.
There were three opinions filed by the California Supreme Court. The
majority opinion of Justice Werdegar, for himself and three other justices, held
that the adoption statutes should be interpreted to allow a biological parent to
waive the termination of parental rights provision and to allow another person
or persons to become co-parents by adoption.75 The majority also found that
the number of parents was not germane to adoption and held that a biological
parent may allow her child to be adopted by other co-parents, not limited to a
total of two parents.76 The majority opinion construed the termination of
parental rights provision as being designed for the personal benefit of the
parents relinquishing and adopting the child, and so it was deemed waivable,
rather than to protect the public interest, which could not be waived.77 While
California courts may not award visitation to a de facto parent, the majority did
not see any inconsistency between that well-established rule and its decision
allowing California courts to award adoption to de facto partners.78
Two additional justices, Baxter and Chin, filed a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. They agreed that two parents is better
than one, so the statutes should be interpreted to allow “second-parent”
adoption by informal same-sex and heterosexual nonmarital cohabiting
partners.79 However, they argued that only two parents, not more, is best for
children, and further argued that California statutes and case law show that
parenting in California contemplates a child having not more than two
parents.80 They construed the termination of rights statute to be designed to
protect the public interest, not the personal benefit of the parents relinquishing

73. Id. § 8548.
74. Id. § 297.
75. Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 561.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 573-74. However, the court agreed that if fraud or duress had been shown Sharon
could revoke her consent to adoption, and remanded that issue to the court of appeals. Id. at 574.
79. Id. at 580.
80. Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 578-79.
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or adopting.81 Furthermore, they found second-parent adoption by cohabiting,
same-sex partners to be in the public interest.82
Justice Janice R. Brown filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. After refuting the majority’s statutory interpretation, she
criticized the majority for “trivializ[ing] family bonds” and “import[ing] the
principles of the marketplace into the realm of home and family . . . .”83 She
read the adoption statutes as specifically authorizing adoption by partners of
biological parents in cases of marriage and registered domestic partnership as
manifesting a legislative intent to require “a legal relationship between the
birth and second parent,”84 and to not allow a partner to adopt “unless the birth
parent and adopting parent have formally joined together to forge a common
future.”85 In a marriage or registered domestic partnership, she identified the
controlling principle as: “If the two adults are uncertain whether the second
parent will be a permanent resident of the household, the adoption ought to
wait until they are ready for that commitment.”86 She rejected the majority’s
“stunted view of parenthood as purely ministerial and economic—signing
consent slips and providing health insurance.”87 She reminded the majority
that all “[s]ociety has a considerable stake in the health and stability of
families . . . [which] provide the seed beds of civic virtue required for
citizenship in a self-governing community.”88 She ridiculed the majority’s
“the-more-parents-the-merrier view of parenthood,”89 and noted: “The law
permits single individuals to adopt a child on their own because one parent is
better than none. It does not follow, however, that two unrelated parents are
better than one.”90 Single parent adoption presents a “choice . . . between
adoption and foster care,” whereas “if the birth parent has a relationship with a
second parent, and then a third, and then a fourth, the child may be worse off
than if the birth parent had simply raised the child alone.”91 She concluded
that the decision to allow adoption by partners who lack the legal commitment
of marriage or domestic partnership registration “maximizes the self-interest

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 577.
See id. at 580-81.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 582.
Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 585.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id.
Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 587.
Id.
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and personal convenience of parents, but poorly serves the state’s children who
deserve as much stability and security as legal process can provide.”92
The majority opinion is astonishingly flimsy as a matter of legal analysis,
long on shallow rhetoric, but short on logic and legal analysis, and inconsistent
with adoption, legislative, and case history. It also embraces the most radical
policy position. The majority’s finding that adoption statues are intended for
the private benefit of adults rather than the public benefit is not only glaringly
erroneous, but revives the long-discredited notion that children are merely the
personal chattels of their parents. The abandonment of the historic practice of
dual parenting and the endorsement of group parenting is deeply troubling, as
is the almost casual judicial acceptance of that radical position. Just a decade
earlier in Johnson v. Calvert the California Supreme Court rejected the idea
that children can have more than two parents.93 In Sharon S., the same court
accepted that position without even citing, much less distinguishing, Calvert.
The refusal of the majority and concurring opinions to recognize the
danger in the Sharon-Annette relationship is extraordinary. If an unmarried
but cohabiting man and woman had begun an adoption proceeding to allow the
man to adopt the woman’s biological child, but the couple separated before
completing the adoption due to high conflict, and the woman had obtained a
protective order because of domestic violence committed by the man, it is
inconceivable that any responsible court would rule that the mother had to go
ahead with the adoption by the hostile ex-partner. But that is effectively what
the California Supreme Court majority and concurring opinions required in the
Sharon S. case, where the only differences from this hypothetical were the
gender of the hostile adopting ex-partner and the homosexual nature of the
nonmarital relationship between the parties.
Justice Brown’s solo dissenting opinion contains the most rigorous legal
analysis and the most realistic policy analysis. It is also the most consistent
with the root paradigm of responsible parenting. It was courageous for Justice
Brown to file her solo opinion. Just a few weeks earlier she had been
nominated by President Bush for a seat on the Federal Court of Appeals in
Washington, D.C.94 Her nomination has been hindered by several Democratic
Senators because of her conservative pro-family and pro-life principles.95 It
showed remarkable integrity for her to write her dissenting opinion in Sharon
92. Id.
93. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8, 786 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
94. See AFL-CIO, ISSUES AND POLITICS, Oppose the Nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, at http://www.aflcio.org/
issuespolitics/rogers_brown.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
95. Thomas Sowell, A Lynch Mob Gathers Around Justice Janice Rogers Brown: Part 3,
CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Oct. 23, 2003, at http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3229 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

PARENTHOOD AND THE LIMITS OF ADULT AUTONOMY

185

S. because gays and lesbians, who have considerable influence in the
Democratic Party, were sure to be displeased with her Sharon S. opinion and,
not surprisingly, continued to work (successfully so far) to delay and block her
nomination.
C. Public Opinion in the U.S. and Europe
A national Gallup poll, conducted May 5-7, 2003, showed that support for
adoption by same-sex couples and partners was 49%, while 48% opposed
same-sex adoption.96 Most other public opinion surveys in the past three years
report similar results.97
By contrast, the Gallup organization’s European Omnibus Survey (“EOS”)
showed strikingly different results based on interviews with more than 15,000
persons living in thirty European countries in January 2003.98 The respondents
were grouped into three categories depending on whether they lived in Old
Europe countries (the fifteen existing EU countries including Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the
UK), New Europe countries (the thirteen countries seeking to join the EU,
including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, and Turkey), or Not-Aligned-with-EU countries (Norway and
Switzerland). The EOS reported the following: 55% of persons from Old
Europe opposed the legalization of adoption by homosexual couples
throughout Europe, compared to 42% who supported it; 57% of persons from
Norway and Switzerland opposed gay adoption; and 76% of persons in New
Europe opposed legalization of adoption by same-sex couples while only 17%

96. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY & GAY
MARRIAGE 45 (2004) (compiled by Karlyn Bowman, Resident Fellow, AEI, and Bryan O’Keefe,
Staff Assistant, AEI) (citing Gallup opinion survey from May 5-7, 2003).
97. Id. (citing PSRA/Kaiser Feb. 7-Sep. 4, 2000 survey reporting 46% favoring and 47%
opposing adoption rights for gay spouses; PSRA/Newsweek poll of April 25-26, 2002 finding
46% favoring and 44% opposing adoption rights for gay spouses; ABC poll of Mar. 27-31, 2002
finding 47% favor and 42% oppose homosexual couples being legally permitted to adopt
children). Conversely, a Harris Interactive poll in January 2000 reported support for adoption of
children by two men or two women living together as a couple at 21% and 22% respectively and
opposition at 57% and 55% respectively. Id. at 46. However, it is important to note that all of
these surveys of public attitudes about allowing same-sex couples to adopt were taken before the
June 27, 2003 Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and it has been
reported that since the Lawrence decision there has been a “backlash” in public opinion against
homosexual relations, including a drop in support for legalized same-sex unions, which had been
increasing in support prior to Lawrence. See, e.g., Susan Page, Americans Less Tolerant on Gay
Issues: Poss Indicates Backlash, USA TODAY, July 29, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WL
5316166.
98. GALLUP
EUROPE,
THE
EUROPEAN
OMNIBUS
SURVEY,
at
http://www.eosgallupeurope.com/homo/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
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supported it.99 In only four of the thirty countries throughout Europe did a
majority of those surveyed favor European legalization of adoption of children
by same-sex couples. In twenty-six nations (eleven of the liberal nations of
Old Europe, both non-EU nations, and all thirteen of the countries of New
Europe), more people reject legalized gay adoption than favor it, with at least
50% of the population (and up to 87% of the population) opposing legalization
of adoption by same-sex couples.100
Conventional wisdom has noted that one difference between European and
American attitudes about same-sex families is that European countries are
more liberal about permitting and giving equal legal recognition to many forms
of consensual adult relations,101 but when it comes to children, Europeans,
including the liberal Scandinavian countries, generally have more
“conservative” regulation in the interests of children than America. The EOS
partially validates that dichotomy because it shows overwhelming opposition
to legalizing adoption by homosexual couples in Europe, compared to the
wide-spread (albeit possibly thin) support for gay couples adopting in the
United States.102
D. Benefits of Father-Mother Childrearing
“As a matter of public policy, if not of morality, it pays for society to
approve of marriage as the best setting for children . . . .”103 For example,
Robert J. Shapiro, Legislative Director and Economic Counsel to Senator

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years from Now, Will We
Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 605-07 (2004).
102. Support for same-sex marriage was stronger in Europe, but showed the same difference
between Old Europe and New Europe. On the question of whether homosexual marriage should
be allowed throughout Europe, the fifteen affluent nations of Old Europe were strongly in favor,
57% to 39% opposed; both of the two non-aligned nations (also very affluent, post-industrial
countries) were even more supportive (65% to 31%); but the New Europe nations were even more
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage (70% to 23%). A majority of those polled in nine of the
fifteen nations of Old Europe favored European same-sex marriage, and in only three of those
nations (Greece, Portugal, and Italy) did the majority oppose legalization. Nearly two-thirds of
those surveyed in both non-aligned nations favored legalizing same-sex marriage. In twelve of
the thirteen nations of New Europe, majorities opposed legalization of same-sex marriage. Thus,
of the total of thirty European nations surveyed, majorities in a majority - fifteen - of those
nations oppose European legalization of same-sex marriage, while majorities in only eleven
nations favor legalization of same-sex marriage. GALLUP EUROPE, supra note 98.
103. Michael Novak, Families: The Best Anti-Poverty Plan, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at
F1.
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Daniel Patrick Moynihan, said: “It is no exaggeration to say that a stable, twoparent family is an American child’s best protection against poverty.”104
Adoption by same-sex couples deliberately deprives children of either a
father or a mother (and since lesbians adopt more often than gays, most often
the deprivation will be of a father). The serious nature of this alteration of the
parenting root paradigm cannot be missed. As the distinguished anthropologist
Bronislaw Malinowski observed:
The most important moral and legal rule concerning the physiological side of
kinship is that no child should be brought into the world without a man . . .
assuming the role of sociological father, that is, guardian and protector, the
male link between the child and the rest of the community. . . . [In all cultures]
there runs the rule that the father is indispensable for the full sociological
status of the child as well as of its mother, that the group consisting of a
woman and her offspring is sociologically incomplete and illegitimate. The
father, in other words, is necessary for the full legal status of the family.105

Dr. Urie Bronfenbrenner reported that even after controlling for such
factors as low income, “children growing up in . . . [single-parent] households
are at greater risk for experiencing a variety of behavioral and educational
problems, including . . . smoking, drinking, early and frequent sexual
experience, and, in the more extreme cases, drugs, suicide, vandalism,
violence, and criminal acts.”106 While children adopted by same-sex couples
will have two adults caring for them, which will provide some advantages,
they will only have parents of a single sex, either two mothers and no father, or
two fathers and no mother. The sociological implications of that are uncertain,
and very troubling.
Parenting by a father and a mother is best for children because there are
gender-linked differences in child-rearing skills; men and women contribute
different, gender-based strengths and attributes to their children’s
development. Although the critical contributions of mothers to the full and
healthy development of children have long been recognized, recent research
validates the common understanding that fathers, as well as mothers, are
extremely important for child development.107 There is “surprising unanimity”

104. Robert J. Shapiro, Part One: The Family Under Economic Stress, in PUTTING CHILDREN
FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE 1990S, at 12 (1990).
105. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, SEX, CULTURE AND MYTH 63 (1962). See also WILLIAM J.
BENNETT, THE BROKEN HEARTH: REVERSING THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 87-88 (2001) (discussing the importance of a father figure for child development).
106. Urie Bronfenbrenner, Discovering What Families Do, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW
COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 34 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).
107. See Preface to DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD 14, 14-16 (Shirley M.H. Hanson &
Frederick W. Bozett eds., 1985); Alan J. Hawkins et al., Rethinking Fathers’ Involvement in Child
Care: A Developmental Perspective, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 531, 532 (1993); Alan J. Hawkins et al.,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

188

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:169

among experts that “[m]en nurture, interact with, and rear competently but
differently from women: not worse, not better . . . differently.”108 When
fathers nurture and care for their children, they do so not quite as “substitute
mothers” but differently, as fathers.109 For example, some studies show that
fathers play with their infant children more than mothers,110 and play more
physical and tactile games than mothers.111 Mothers tend to talk and play more
gently with infant children.112 Mothers smile and verbalize more to the infant
than fathers do,113 and generally rate their infant sons as cuddlier than fathers
do.114 One study found that “[m]en encouraged their children’s curiosity in the
solution of intellectual and physical challenges, supported the child’s
persistence in solving problems, and did not become overly solicitous with
regard to their child’s failures.”115 Another study found that six-month-old
infants whose fathers were actively involved with them “had higher scores on
the Bailey Test of Mental and Motor Development.”116 Infants whose fathers
spend more time with them are more socially responsive and better able to
withstand stressful situations than infants relatively deprived of substantial
interaction with their fathers.117 Psychologist Erik Erikson noted that father
love and mother love are different kinds of love; “fathers ‘love more
dangerously’ because their love is more ‘expectant . . . more instrumental’ . . .
than that of mothers.”118 Fathers more than mothers tend to appreciate the

Turning the Hearts of the Fathers to the Children: Nurturing the Next Generation, 33 BYU
STUD. 273, 279-81 (1993).
108. KYLE D. PRUETT M.D., THE NURTURING FATHER: JOURNEY TOWARD THE COMPLETE
MAN 30-31 (1987).
109. Id. at 77, 87.
110. L. Colette Jones, Father-Infant Relationships in the First Year of Life, in DIMENSIONS
OF FATHERHOOD 92, 103 (Shirley M.H. Hanson & Frederick W. Bozett eds., 1985) (citing Irma
Rendina and Jean D. Dickerscheid, Father Involvement with First-Born Infants, 25 FAM.
COORDINATOR 373-79 (1976)).
111. See Jones, supra note 110. See generally Heidelise Als et al., Analysis of Face-to Face
Interaction in Infant-Adult Dyads, in SOCIAL INTERACTION ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGICAL
ISSUES 33 (Michael E. Lamb et al. eds., 1979) (infants generally remain more still when held by
fathers than mothers, and fathers tend to move the infant’s body or limbs more often than
mothers).
112. PRUETT, supra note 108, at 33.
113. See Tiffany Field, Interaction Behaviors of Primary Versus Secondary Caretaker
Fathers, 14 DEV. PSYCHOL. 183, 184 (1978).
114. Jones, supra note 110, at 105.
115. Kyle D. Pruett, The Paternal Presence, 74 FAM. IN SOC’Y 46, 48 (1993).
116. Id.
117. PRUETT, supra note 108, at 35 (citing Ross Parke, Perspectives on Father Infant
Interaction, in THE HANDBOOK OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT 549 (Joy D. Osofsky ed., 1979)).
118. Pruett, supra note 115, at 49 (quoting ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS 106
(1968)).
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value of, and foster child interaction with, extra-familial socializing influences,
to provide instrumental leadership, to establish and enforce standards regarding
unacceptable emotions and behaviors, and absorb hostility from children best,
whereas mothers provide more expressive, integrative, and nurturing
childrearing,119 and their love is more unconditional.120
Separation of children from their fathers has been called “the leading cause
of declining child well-being in our society. It is also the engine driving our
most urgent social problems, from crime to adolescent pregnancy to child
sexual abuse to domestic violence against women.”121 A report based on
studies in Europe concluded that “[f]amily structure [is] clearly associated
with” risk factors for adolescents, and children without intact mother-father
families are more likely “to be heavy drinkers, have experience of drugs, of
heterosexual intercourse, no school qualifications, to be unemployed or, among
young women, to have experienced pregnancy.”122
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
[t]he institution of marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal
entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized structure
of our democratic society. In recognition of that role, and as part of their
general overarching concern for serving the best interests of children, state
laws almost universally express an appropriate preference for the formal
family.123

Six years ago the Alabama Supreme Court expressed it in this way: “While
much study, and even more controversy, continue to center upon the effects of
homosexual parenting, the inestimable developmental benefit of a loving home
environment that is anchored by a successful marriage is undisputed.”124
Another state’s court of appeals agreed that a stable, marital family is best for
children because it is an “environment in which [the child] will most likely

119. Robert H. Bradley, Fathers and the School-Age Child, in DIMENSIONS OF FATHERHOOD
141, 152 (Shirley M.H. Hanson & Frederick W. Bozett eds., 1985); BRUCE LOGAN, NEW
ZEALAND EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE LAW 6
(2000).
120. Pruett, supra note 115, at 49.
121. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM 1 (1995).
122. Helen Sweeting et al., Teenage Family Life, Lifestyles and Life Chances: Associations
with Family Structure, Conflict with Parents and Joint Family Activity, 12 INT’L J. OF L., POL’Y
& FAM. 15, 38 (1998).
123. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983).
124. Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So.2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (upholding the modification of child
custody due to the custodial mother’s open lesbian relationship and the father’s remarriage
forming a stable traditional family).
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receive not only love, warmth, support, care and concern, but also consistency,
stability and physical and spiritual nurture.”125
E.

Arguments Against Generalized Gay Adoption

There is abundant evidence that nonmarital cohabitation (of heterosexual
and same-sex couples)
is an environment of elevated risk to children of child abuse, child sexual
abuse, relational instability, exposure to adult domestic violence, economic
deprivation, and immoral and dangerous behavior modeling. Most of the
studies . . . focus[] on heterosexual nonmarital cohabitation but . . . the
advocates and defenders of adoption by same-sex couples failed to provide any
credible evidence that gay/lesbian cohabitation is less-risky than nonmarital
cohabitation generally. (Indeed, some of the studies cited by supporters of gay
parenting have noted high rates of violence and abuse among same-sex
couples, confirming those concerns rather than alleviating concerns.)126

It is nonmarital cohabitation that is identified with special risk to children.127
Potential risks of gay couples generally adopting must be honestly
recognized. For example, both theory and empirical studies suggest that
disproportionate percentages of children raised by homosexual parents may
develop homosexual interests and behaviors. “[T]here appears to be some
significant differences between children raised by lesbian mothers versus
heterosexual mothers in their family relationships, gender identity and gender
behavior.”128 One study that endorsed gay parenting admitted that 23.5% of
the post-adolescent children it studied who were raised by gay or lesbian
parents became homosexual, a much higher rate of homosexuality than is
found in the population generally.129
Advocates of gay adoption argue that it is better to place children with a
gay or lesbian couple than to leave some children unplaced for adoption.
However, that is not a zero-sum proposition. In Utah, all children eligible for
adoption through the state’s child welfare agency have been placed for
adoption. Most were placed with a mother and father and none were reported

125. Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988)
(affirming custody modification decree where father was granted custody after establishing a
successful nine-year marriage while mother with custody had gone through four lesbian
relationships).
126. Scott H. Clark, Married Persons Favored as Adoptive Parents: The Utah Perspective, 5
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203, 218 (2003).
127. Id. at 218-19.
128. Philip A. Belcastro et al., A Review of Data Based Studies Addressing the Affects of
Homosexual Parenting on Children’s Sexual and Social Functioning, 20 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 105, 119 (1993).
129. Id.
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as being placed with same-sex couples, so exclusion of same-sex couples from
adoption does not necessarily mean that children would be left in foster care
who otherwise could be adopted.130
It is sometimes argued that disallowing gay couple adoption is irrational
because in many cases the children concerned are already living in the “at risk”
environment with the gay couple, so they may as well have the benefits that
would come from adoption by the unrelated parent.
But that
“dollars-for-risks” argument ignores the loss of the normative value of the law
and the message of the law about the high “gold-standard” of parenting
environments required of those who adopt. This argument confuses problems
of benefits laws with adoption law; if the problem is one of particular benefits,
the relevant benefits laws should be amended, not the adoption laws. It also
exaggerates the “benefits” available through adoption, most of which can be
provided by will, contract, gift, private arrangement, and other forms of private
ordering.
Permitting gay adoptions opens the door for legalizing same-sex marriage.
One key factor that the Vermont Supreme Court relied heavily upon when it
directed the state to legalize same-sex marriage or to create an equivalent
130. Rep. Nora Stephens, Statement Before the Utah House of Representatives Committee
(Feb. 17, 2000) (notes on file with author) (relating that in 1999, the Utah Division of Child and
Family Services placed 383 children for adoption: 94% with married two-parent homes, 5% with
single women, and 1% with single men. In December 1999, 103 children in DCFS were eligible
for adoption and all had been placed for adoption. In January/February 2000, 100 children were
available for adoption with DCFS; 175 families have applied to adopt children); Holly Mullen,
Utah Bans Some Adoptions by Gay Couples, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 23, 1999, at A1 (more than
93% (305 of 328) of all children in DCFS custody placed for adoption in 1998 were placed with
married couples). Scott Clark, the former Chairman of the Utah Board of Child and Family
Services, rejected the claim that disallowing unmarried couples to adopt has impaired adoption in
Utah:
The charge that the disqualification of unmarried couples from the adoption of children in
state custody would in fact harm the children by reducing the number of prospective
adoptive couples appeared to be entirely speculative. No adoptive placements of children
with unmarried couples had ever been (knowingly) made by the Division of Child &
Family Services. Few, if any, unmarried couples were identified for training for foster
care or adoptive placements, although a gay couple . . . claimed to have been trained by
the Division of Child & Family Services as prospective foster parents.
Clark, supra note 126, at 208. Clark also notes:
The number of children in the custody of the state of Utah hovers in the range of 2,500 to
3,000, and although foster families are always in short supply, the challenges of the
Division of Child & Family Services are, for the most part, financial. In 1998 (when the
controversy began), the Division of Child & Family Services placed 327 children for
adoption; none of the adoptive placements were with unmarried couples. Less than 7% of
adoptive placements of children in state custody were with single persons, most of whom
were kinship placements.
Id. at 204.
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status for same-sex couples in Baker v. State was the fact that the legislature
had allowed gay and lesbian couples to adopt. 131 The Vermont Supreme Court
reasoned in part that if same-sex couples could adopt, there was no justification
for not allowing them to marry.132 Legislators in Mississippi reportedly were
motivated to enact their ban on gay adoptions “by the recognition of civil
unions in Vermont . . . .”133
Likewise, the majority opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health asserted that its decision to
compel the legalization of same-sex marriage was supported by the fact that
the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family
regardless of whether the intended parent is married or unmarried, whether the
child is adopted or born into a family, whether assistive technology was used
to conceive the child, and whether the parent or her partner is heterosexual,
homosexual, or bisexual.134

The majority noted: “Adoption and certain insurance coverage for assisted
reproductive technology are available to married couples, same-sex couples,
and single individuals alike.”135 Furthermore, the majority in Goodridge cited
the approval of gay couple adoption, among other things, as proof that
“Massachusetts has responded supportively to ‘the changing realities of the
American family,’ and has moved vigorously to strengthen the modern family
in its many variations.”136 Same-sex marriage would save “same-sex
couples . . . the sometimes lengthy and intrusive process of second-parent
adoption to establish their joint parentage.”137 The approval of same-sex
couple adoption is proof that the legislature “has drawn the conclusion that a
child’s best interest is not harmed by being raised and nurtured by same-sex
parents.”138 Concurring, Justice Greaney also emphasized that same-sex
marriage was supported because “[t]he rights of couples to have children, to
adopt, and to be foster parents, regardless of sexual orientation and marital
status, are firmly established.”139

131. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 882 (Vt. 1999).
132. Id.
133. Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their
Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 896 (2000).
134. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003).
135. Id. at 962 n.24 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 1 (2004) and Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993)).
136. Id. at 963 (quoting Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)) (internal citation
omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 965 n.30.
139. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

PARENTHOOD AND THE LIMITS OF ADULT AUTONOMY

193

Similarly, in Andersen v. King County, a Washington trial court relied
upon the legalization of gay couple adoption in the state in ruling that same-sex
marriage must be legalized.140 The court’s feathery opinion notes that:
Many families today are created through adoption, the foster parent system and
assisted reproduction technologies. This last point, by the way, is well
illustrated by some of the plaintiffs who, thanks to government recognition of
the fact that their sexual orientation is no bar to good parenting, are presently
able to enjoy family lives with children.141

The court also emphasized that:
Today the law and society fully recognize (as well they should) the value of
children who join the human family by means of in vitro fertilization, sperm
donation, egg donation or surrogacy or who join a new family by way of
adoption. It rationally serves no state interest to harm certain of those children
by devaluing the immediate families that they have joined.142

“[P]eer[ing] into the future,” Judge Downing also foresaw that:
Many, many children are going to be raised in the homes of gay and lesbian
partners. Present social trends will undoubtedly continue. Gay and lesbian
couples will feel the human instinct to wish to raise children, they will have
available either the supportive adoption laws or the technological means to
begin raising a family and they will enjoy the increasing public acceptance of
such families. All this is certain.143

The court rejected the additional burden imposed upon gay couples and their
families. The court stated “[t]hat they should have to pay for these privileges
while others do not, is not supported by the ‘real and substantial differences
bearing a natural, reasonable, and just relation to the subject matter of the act
in respect to which the classification is made’ . . . .”144
While the analysis in this opinion can easily be questioned (as, again,
rhetoric was substituted by the court for legal analysis, and judicial
endorsement of social trends replaced adherence to the rule of law),145 the
relevant point is that the court clearly linked same-sex marriage and legalized
adoption by same-sex couples.

140. Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *11 (Wash.
Super. Aug. 4, 2004).
141. Id. at *9.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *10.
144. Id. at *11 (quoting State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 59 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Wash. 1936)).
145. See supra Section III B (discussing the Sharon S. case, where the court substituted
rhetoric for legal analysis and judicial endorsement of social trends replaced adherence to the rule
of law).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is best for children and for society that children be raised by a mother
and father who are committed (through marriage) to each other as well as to
the child. The marital commitment of the parents to each other reinforces their
commitment to the child, and also increases their individual and joint capacity
to provide for the child and even to sacrifice for the child’s well-being. It is
not just the simplistic “addition” that two adults can provide more resources
and care for a child than one, rather it is the “multiplication” by which the
security of the marital commitment of spouses to each other and to society
enhances the abilities and incentives of both to parent well. The marriage
commitment exponentially increases the efficiency of the many complimentary
roles that men and women perform in parenting functions. Marriage is not just
one among many equally good environments for child-rearing; it has been
shown to be, by far, the best environment for parenting.
Children are entitled to be raised by a mother and a father whenever
possible. The law should not shortchange children by officially approving
their adoption into semi-orphan status by same-sex couples. To preserve the
historic root paradigm of our society that puts parenting and posterity at a high
priority, we must recognize that it requires sacrifice of some things, including
some personal autonomy. We must resist the impulse to redefine the
relationship and to modify the commitment to accommodate self-serving
sexual autonomy interests. “If love is to feature in human relations, selfhood
must be given up for otherhood . . . . [Adults] must cease to sacrifice others for
personal gain and begin to sacrifice themselves for [their children].”146
Because the state has an important historic parens patriae commitment to
secure the welfare of children, because the state’s interest in protecting
vulnerable children must take precedence over its interest in fostering the
sexual choices of autonomous adults when those interests conflict, and because
all citizens have a stake in promoting the welfare of children (the future of the
polis, the future security of the state and its citizens), parenting necessarily
imposes some limits upon the autonomy of adults who wish to assume the
responsibilities of parenthood. While some adults may fantasize about a world
in which there is no conflict between adult sexuality and the needs of children,
that is not the real world we live in. Children can be harmed in many ways
(direct and indirect, tangible and intangible, immediate and long-term) by
many irresponsible behaviors of adults, including some sexual choices
available to their parents. The responsibilities of parenthood historically have
taken, legally now do take, and ethically should continue to take priority over
the autonomy interests of adults regarding their sexual relationships.

146. Myers, supra note 1, at 55.
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